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Past research has shown that children as young as age 3 years are able 
to distinguish the difference between mental entities and real objects (Estes, 
Wellman, & Woolley, 1989). Yet, many children still display persistent fears of 
imaginary creatures, which they claim are not real. In the present study, a 
replication-extension of P. Harris, E. Brown, C. Marriott, S. Whittall, and S. 
Harmer (1991), the researcher examined children's perceptions of imaginary 
creatures through a brief interview. Children were asked to pretend there 
existed either a monster or a rabbit in one of two large boxes. Children were 
then left alone to investigate the boxes, while their behavior was videotaped in 
the experimenter's absence. The children were then asked questions about 
their actions upon the experimenter's return. Unlike the original, the present 
study was modified to include the group of children who did not respond to the 
boxes in the experimenter's absence. The videotapes were coded by an 
individual blind to the purpose of the study, and nonresponding children's 
behavior was grouped into one of six No-Response categories (Obedient, 
Scared, Uninterested/Don't Care, Confused, Unsure of Novel Situation, and 
Certain the Box is Empty). When asked at the outset, a significant number of 
children specified they were just pretending about the reality of the creature. Yet 
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during the experimenter's absence, a significant number of children in the 
monster condition exhibited behavior characterized as Scared. Other significant 
No-Response categories included Uninterested/Don't Care, Unsure of Novel 
Situation, and Certain the Box is Empty. Of those children who investigated the 
boxes, the pretend box was approached significantly more quickly than the 
neutral box. Upon the experimenter's return, almost half of the children had 
changed their minds about the presence of a creature in the box and admitted to 
wondering if a creature actually existed in the box. Lastly, a significant number 
of children in the present study believed a creature could be generated through 
pretending. While not everything is consistent with the original study, the 
present study supports the basic tenets of Harris et al. (1991) and even goes a 
step further by showing a significant number of children who believe a creature 
can be generated through pretending. In addition, many children displayed fear 
or uncertainty about the contents of the box, and often admitted this to the 
experimenter. Children seem to be tempted to believe in things which they have 
only pretended are real. 
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Introduction 
Magic, according to Fisher and Fisher (1993), consists of illusory ideas 
about how extraordinary forces can be controlled and compelled to do one's 
bidding. Webster's New World Dictionary (1982) proposes a similar definition 
describing magic as the pretended art of controlling the supernatural. Yet why 
(or how) is it that young children utilize this type of thinking to the point they are 
physically frightened by their own thoughts? For instance, a youngster at 
bedtime may insist on a parent checking under the bed for monsters before 
turning off the light. 
Jersild and Holmes (1935) report fears are not uncommon during 
childhood. In addition, childhood fears can be quite varied. For instance, some 
children fear specific, concrete stimuli (animals, water), while others have fears 
involving more abstract ideas (getting lost, death). Schroeder, Gordon, and 
Hawk (1983), as cited in Schwartz and Johnson (1985), indicate it is likely that 
developmental factors play a part in the presence of childhood fears. One 
theory associates the child's level of cognitive development to the development 
of fears, where the lower the level of cognitive functioning, the more concrete the 
object of the fear. Older children reportedly exhibit fears of more imaginary 
types of objects as their cognitive skills develop. According to Morris and 
Kratochwill (1983), at age three, the most common fears are masks, dark, 
animals, and separation from parent. At age four, parent separation, animals, 
dark, and noises were reportedly the most common occurring fears. At five 
years, common fears include animals, "bad" people, dark, separation from 
parent, and bodily harm. Finally, at six years, children become fearful of 
supernatural beings (i.e., ghosts, witches), bodily injuries, thunder and 
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lightening, dark, sleeping or staying alone, and separation from parent (Morris 
and Kratochwill, 1983). While certain fears seem to be a widely reported 
occurrence, a firm understanding of when and why these fears begin to exist is 
still under debate. 
The present investigation is designed to examine the discrepancy 
between children's overt behaviors and their conceptual knowledge about the 
existence of make believe or fantasy creatures. Past research has shown 
children do not always possess a firm barrier between reality and fantasy at the 
verbal level when it comes to supernatural entities (Harris, Brown, Marriott, 
Whittall, and Harmer, 1991). 
Literature Review 
Sixty-five years ago Piaget set a precedent in the field of child 
development. Amidst his theory of human development was the contention that 
young children are unable to distinguish real from imaginary objects. More 
specifically, preschool age children are unable to discriminate between an 
object, such as a balloon, and its mental counterpart, an imagined balloon. 
These early studies suggested young children were not able to distinguish 
between the real, physical world and the mental world. Supposedly, youngsters 
associate thinking with external behaviors such as talking or doing. In addition, 
Piaget contended that children younger than six or seven years old believed 
dreams were external, objective events and that the mind was only a reference 
to one's physical head (Piaget, 1929; Estes, Wellman, and Woolley, 1989). A 
combination of these beliefs, in Piaget's terms, has been coined childhood 
realism. In general, realism is the attribution of real, physical properties to 
mental phenomena (Estes et al., 1989). 
Keil (1979) has researched semantic and conceptual development in 
children. This research focused on the relationship between concepts and word 
meaning in cognitive development. From Keil's research comes what he has 
defined as ontological knowledge. This knowledge refers to a person's 
understanding of the basic categories of existence or simply, what kind of things 
there are (i.e., living, nonliving). Building on this concept, Estes et al. (1989) 
disputed Piaget's earlier claims. Estes et al. distinguished between two forms of 
realism. The first, ontological realism, is a belief that mental phenomena are 
real, physical phenomena. An example might be a young child who believes his 
dream is an external picture visible to others. A second form of realism is called 
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epistemological realism. Here, the focus is on the child's conception of how 
knowledge is acquired. For example, according to Estes et al. (1989), "If ideas 
are literally physical things (the ontological issue) then we could acquire them 
(the epistemological issue) in the same way that we acquire physical things" (p. 
44). According to this explanation, we would collect mental images in the same 
way we acquire real, physical objects. This example indicates the two forms of 
realism are closely connected, yet they are distinctly separate notions. One 
refers to how ideas exist, and the other to how ideas originate. According to 
Estes et al. (1989) Piaget made no differentiation between these two forms of 
realism. It is possible that a child may display one form of realism, but not the 
other. Estes et al. (1989) assert it is not likely that children are ontological 
realists, but it is quite possible they are epistemological realists. 
Several studies have been conducted to examine children's 
understanding of mental entities. To begin, analysis was done to identify the 
criteria adults use to distinguish between mental entities and real, physical 
objects. Wellman and Estes (1986) claim children can differentiate real, 
physical objects from mental entities on the basis of several such criteria. One 
of these is behavioral-sensory evidence, or whether the entity can be seen, 
touched, and physically acted upon. A second criteria is public existence, which 
is fulfilled when a child believes other people experience the entity. A third 
criteria is consistent existence, which implies the entity consistently exists over 
time. Wellman and Estes (1986) conducted a study which tested the ability of 
children ages 3 to 5 to distinguish real from mental entities on the basis of these 
criteria. The design also required the children to categorize the entities 
appropriately. The results suggest that children as young as age three years old 
are able to correctly distinguish real from non-real entities on the basis of these 
criteria. 
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Estes et al. (1989) set out to further test their hypothesis that children may 
be epistemological realists, but not ontological realists, by conducting a series of 
experiments. One study posed children with simple judgment questions, similar 
to the study discussed above (Wellman and Estes, 1986), to see if they could 
differentiate mental entities from close impostors. A second study focused on 
children's understanding of mental images, and lastly, the researchers examined 
children's perceptions of mental images versus photographs. The results of 
these studies suggest preschool children consistently judge that mental 
phenomena (i.e., thoughts, memories, dreams, and mental images) differ in 
underlying ways from physical phenomena. In addition, the children involved in 
these experiments frequently gave accurate explanations for their correct 
responses. The results clearly support the experimenters' notions that young 
children are not ontological realists. Even very young children displayed a fluent 
understanding of the basic differences between mental entities and physical 
objects (Estes et al., 1989). Young children's understanding of mental entities 
appears drastically different from what Piaget once thought. 
Flavell (1986) has studied an area closely related to the fantasy-reality 
distinction, that of the appearance-reality distinction. The appearance-reality 
distinction is made when a child distinguishes between how things presently 
appear to the senses and how they actually are. Flavell's (1986) contention is 
that the appearance-reality distinction is not present in children younger than 6 
or 7 years old. 
Flavell, Flavell and Green (1989) explored the onset of a transitional 
period in the development of the appearance-reality distinction. The results of 
their study suggest the transition between understanding appearance versus 
reality begins at approximately 5 years of age. Five year olds began to show 
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evident cognition about the distinction which enabled them to solve basic 
appearance-reality tasks. 
However, Flavell's (1986) research does not incorporate the element of 
mental entities. When it comes to imagining an entity of the supernatural type, 
such as a monster, children are often not able to differentiate their thoughts or 
dreams from reality. Many of us are familiar with young children's unfounded, 
yet persistent, fears of imaginary creatures such as ghosts and monsters. It 
seems that often this type of "magical thinking" in young children gets in the way 
of what they know to be reality. 
Most adults and children alike would admit that common everyday objects 
(a cup) meet all of the previously mentioned criteria to distinguish mental from 
real entities. Specifically, they can be seen and touched (behavioral-sensory 
evidence), they can be experienced by others (public existence), and they exist 
over time (consistent existence). However, supernatural phenomena (ghosts 
and witches) may not meet all of these criteria. Could it be that young children 
have a firm grasp of the fantasy- reality distinction only as it applies to common, 
familiar objects? To answer this question it is necessary to assess preschooler's 
judgment of supernatural imagined items compared to ordinary imagined items. 
For it has been shown they are aware that ordinary imagined items are not real 
(Harris et al., 1991). 
Another group of researchers has found results that contradict those of 
Piaget. Harris et al. (1991) conducted a series of four experiments which 
suggest that young children are able to distinguish real from imaginary entities. 
What is intriguing, however, is the finding that children display persistent fear of 
many imaginary, supernatural entities (i.e., monsters) despite their knowledge 
that they are only imaginary. 
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In the first experiment (Harris et al., 1991), four (ISM4) and six (N=14) 
year olds were asked to judge three different types of items. The types were real 
items (i.e., a cup), ordinary imagined items which corresponded to the real items 
(i.e., a mental image of a cup) and, lastly, supernatural imagined items (i.e., a 
mental image of a witch that flies in the sky) for which there is no real existing 
counterpart. To begin, each child was given two pretest items. The pretest 
items consisted of the child identifying a real pencil as such and then making a 
"picture inside your head of a pencil" (p. 107). The child was then asked if the 
visualized pencil was visible to the experimenter and if it was real. Systematic 
feedback was given during the pretest items pertaining to real and imagined real 
items. The purpose of the feedback was to encourage the children to be 
thoughtful about differentiating between real and imaginary items. There was no 
pre-test feedback given for supernatural items (Harris et al., 1991). 
On the real test items, the children were asked two questions in regard to 
the three item types: first, whether or not the experimenter could see the item 
and, second, whether or not it was real. The real entities were a balloon, a cup 
and a pair of scissors. The ordinary imagined entities were an image of the 
three real items, and the supernatural imagined entities were an image of a 
monster that wags its tail, an image of a witch that flies in the sky, and an image 
of a ghost that comes through the window. It was predicted the children would 
be able to distinguish between the real item and its imaginary counterpart. The 
question to be examined was how the children would judge the supernatural 
imagined item. The experimenters outlined two possible outcomes. First, the 
children might judge the supernatural items to be like the real items, visible and 
real to everyone. On the other hand, they might categorize the entities with the 
ordinary imagined items, neither visible nor real to the public (Harris et al., 
1991). 
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The results of Experiment 1 indicated children in both age groups were 
able to differentiate clearly between real items as one group and ordinary and 
supernatural imagined items as another. A 2 X 3 ANOVA of age (younger and 
older) X item type (real, ordinary imagined, supernatural imagined) revealed a 
main effect of item type and an interaction of age X item type. Planned 
comparisons showed real entities gained more realist responses than ordinary 
imagined items and supernatural imagined items. The two types of imagined 
items (ordinary real and supernatural) were judged alike. Overall, four year olds 
contrived more realist responses than six year olds. This difference was not 
evident for real items, was borderline significant for ordinary imagined items, and 
was statistically significant for supernatural imagined items (Harris et al., 1991). 
The results of the first experiment showed that children were able to 
differentiate accurately between real and imagined items. In addition, the ability 
to differentiate between the two was developmental^ linked to age. These 
results, however, did not enlighten the researchers about children's insistent 
fears of supernatural creatures. The second experiment was designed to 
explore the hypothesis that certain types of imaginary creatures may arouse 
fear. Because they arouse fear, children begin to regard them as real. To 
clarify, if a child dreams about a monster chasing him, the image may produce 
some physiological symptoms associated with fear. The child may then 
conclude that because the physiological cues are present, it could only be the 
result of a real creature (Harris et al., 1991). 
In Experiment 2 (Harris et al., 1991) children made the same judgments 
about real, ordinary imagined, and supernatural imagined items as in Experiment 
1. The only alteration was in the presentation of the supernatural imagined 
items. After imagining, for example, a "picture of a witch that flies in the sky," the 
children were told to "make a picture of a witch that flies in the sky and comes 
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chasing after you" (p. 109). For each type of supernatural item, a monster that 
wags its tail, a witch that flies in the sky, and a ghost that comes through the 
window, the children were to imagine the entity as chasing after them. The 
children were then asked if the experimenter could see the entity and if it was 
real. Lastly, the children were asked if they were "really scared when it came 
chasing after you, or just pretend scared?" (p. 110). Wording the question like 
this was done to encourage children to distinguish between being really scared 
and just pretending they felt scared as they imagined the entity chasing after 
them. The experimenter also asked the children why they were or were not 
scared, depending on their response to the previous question. The children 
were given no feedback on the real test items in this experiment (Harris et al., 
1991). 
The results of Experiment 2 indicated children were again able to 
differentiate clearly between real items as one group and ordinary and 
supernatural imagined items as another group. A 2 X 3 ANOVA of age (younger 
and older) X item type (real, ordinary imagined, supernatural imagined) revealed 
only a significant main effect of item type. T-tests revealed children gave more 
realist responses for the real items than they did for the ordinary imagined and 
supernatural imagined items. Once again, the two types of imagined items 
(ordinary real and supernatural) were judged alike. The children were asked 
whether or not they felt afraid in regards to the supernatural imagined entities. 
The children in the younger group confessed to experiencing fear for a mean of 
.79 items out of three. The older group admitted to fear for a mean of 1.36 
items. The researchers' attempt to produce a mildly frightening image was 
partially successful, given the children's self-reports were accepted as valid. Of 
the items for which fear was acknowledged, both younger and older children 
made non-realist judgments. Children's responses when asked why they were 
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or were not afraid were also analyzed. Responses were assigned by two 
independent judges to one of five categories: not real, item properties, subject's 
powers, positive view of item, and other. A t-test uncovered a significant age 
difference for subject powers. Younger children claimed to be able to defeat or 
elude the creature, while older children did not make this response (Harris et al., 
1991). 
Overall, the results of Experiment 2 showed both age groups continuing 
to categorize supernatural imaginary items with ordinary imaginary items. The 
researchers suggested perhaps a stronger manipulation of supernatural, 
imaginary entities would have resulted in more realist responses. Experiment 3 
was designed to obtain a more direct look at children's behavior toward 
imaginary creatures. The children (N=20 younger, N=20 older) were asked to 
imagine a supernatural entity, as in Experiments 1 and 2. However, instead of 
asking them to imagine the creature in their head, they were asked to pretend 
there was a creature in one of two large boxes. In the other box they were 
asked to pretend there was a puppy. Next they were asked how they would 
behave toward the boxes, following which their actual behavior was observed 
(Harris et al., 1991). 
The researchers hypothesized the children would act indifferently toward 
the boxes if they admitted the imaginary creatures did not really exist. However, 
if the children wondered if what they had imagined could possibly exist, they 
would select behavior aimed toward the monster box as opposed to the puppy 
box (Harris et al., 1991). 
Experiment 3 (Harris et al., 1991) began with an introduction phase. 
During this phase, the children were asked to pretend there was "a monster that 
will bite your finger off" in one box and "a little, friendly puppy that will lick your 
finger" (p.113) in the other. Each box contained a small, visible hole, large 
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enough for a child's finger to poke through. The children were then questioned 
about the two creatures. The questioning process was categorized into five 
stages: memory check - checking children's memory for the location and 
attributes of the two creatures, hypothetical choice of box - the children were 
asked if they wanted to put their finger in the monster box or the puppy box. 
After making their choice, the children were asked if they would rather poke a 
stick (placed nearby) into the hole instead of their finger, reality check - children 
were asked, in regards to both monster and puppy, if there was really such a 
creature that would bite or lick their finger, or if they were just pretending, actual 
choice of box - the children were then asked to show the experimenter by putting 
their finger or stick into one of the boxes. Ten seconds after the child 
approached a first box, he/she was prompted to approach the other if they had 
not already done so. The choice of box and manner of approach was recorded 
during this stage, and debriefing - before the children left they were asked to 
look in each box to see that they were both empty. They were then thanked for 
playing the pretend game (Harris et al., 1991). 
All 20 of the older children and 18 of the 20 younger children answered 
correctly on the memory check questions. Analysis of hypothetical choice of box 
revealed the majority of both groups chose to approach the puppy box first (18 of 
20 older, 13 of 16 younger, four younger remained silent). Results of this stage 
also showed children were more willing to use their finger as opposed to the 
stick when approaching the puppy box as compared with the monster box (Harris 
et al., 1991). 
In the reality check stage, 16 of the 20 older children admitted they were 
just pretending. The remaining four older kids claimed there was actually a 
puppy and monster in each box. Among the younger children, of the 18 who 
replied, 11 admitted they were pretending there was a puppy, and seven 
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believed there really was a puppy in the box. In regards to the monster, of the 
16 younger children, 13 claimed they were pretending and three claimed there 
was really a monster in the box. Overall, the majority of children in both groups 
claimed neither the puppy nor the monster was real, although the younger 
children were less sure of this claim (Harris et al., 1991). 
Analysis was also done on the results of the children's actual choice of 
box. Fourteen older children approached the puppy box and six approached the 
monster box. Ten of these children approached both boxes with the stick, one 
child used a finger for both, and seven shifted their choice, using a finger for the 
puppy box and the stick for the monster box (the remaining two older children 
approached only one box). Among the younger children, 12 approached the 
puppy box, seven the monster box, and one responded ambiguously. Twelve 
younger children also approached both boxes with a stick, however, none used 
a finger for both. Four younger children shifted in their approach to the boxes. 
Three used a finger to approach the puppy box and a stick for the monster box, 
and one did the opposite, using a finger to approach the monster box and a stick 
for the puppy box (four younger children abstained from approaching one or 
both boxes). Overall results combining both age groups determined only ten 
children were more cautious when they approached the puppy box as opposed 
to the monster box (Harris et al., 1991). 
The results of Experiment 3 show the majority of the children in both 
groups admitted the monster was just pretend. However, many children were 
still hesitant to approach the monster box. Harris et al. (1991 )suggested one 
possible explanation. In spite of their apparent understanding of the difference 
between reality and fantasy, the children may not have been convinced of the 
non-existence of the creature they had imagined. Alternatively, it could be that 
the children were merely cooperating with the experimenter. Possibly, the 
13 
children were led to assume they were engaging in an intricate game of make-
believe with the experimenter. It is possible the children interpreted their role in 
the game was to act as if there were actually a puppy and monster in each box. 
The fourth experiment was designed to control for this possibility (Harris et al., 
1991). 
Experiment 4 was designed similarly to Experiment 3, with several 
modifications. The first change was videotaping the children's behavior toward 
the imaginary creatures in the experimenters absence. This tactic was 
employed to eliminate possible demand characteristics of the experimenter's 
presence. A second major change took place at the beginning of each 
experiment. The children were asked to look inside the two boxes to assure 
each was empty (Harris et al., 1991). 
Twenty-four younger children and 24 older children took part in 
Experiment 4. Half of the children in each age group were asked to pretend 
there was a frightening monster in one of two boxes, while the other half of both 
groups were asked to pretend there was a friendly rabbit in one of the two 
boxes. The experimenter then asked five questions to be sure the child 
understood and remembered the instructions. Questions one through four were 
directed to the color, friendliness, desire and location of the pretend creature. 
Question 5 asked about the reality status of the creature. Incorrect responses 
were not corrected. Following questioning, the experimenter left the room for 
two minutes. The children were filmed during the experimenter's absence. 
Further questioning followed upon the experimenter's return. The children were 
asked question (6) "What did you do while I was gone? Did you stay sitting or 
did you stand up?" (p. 117), (7) "And did you look inside one of the boxes?" (p. 
117), (8) "And which box did you look inside?" (p. 117). If the child admitted 
opening one of the boxes, the experimenter asked which one and continued 
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questioning. (9) "And what did you think when you went to open the box? Did 
you think there was nothing inside or did you think to yourself: 'I wonder if there's 
a nice, white, bunny rabbit (horrible, mean, black monster) inside'?" (p. 117). If 
the child denied looking inside the boxes, the experimenter inquired as to why 
not and asked, "Were you sure there was nothing inside the box or did you 
wonder whether there was a bunny (monster) inside?" (p. 117). The last 
question was asked, pointing to the neutral box, (10) "What about that box 
there? What if you pretended very, very hard that there was a monster (rabbit) 
inside, what would happen? Would there suddenly be a monster (rabbit) inside 
the box if you pretended very hard?...Why? (Why not?)" (Harris et al., 1991, p. 
117). 
Children's responses to memory questions one through four revealed 
younger children were less accurate than older children concerning the monster, 
but equally as accurate with respect to the rabbit. A two-way ANOVA of age 
(younger and older) X creature (monster and rabbit) revealed an interaction of 
age X creature. As compared with the older children, younger children were less 
accurate concerning the monster, but just as accurate concerning the rabbit. 
Four of the younger children refused to allow the experimenter to leave the 
room. All four were in the monster condition. Of those who allowed the 
experimenter to leave, 10 of 20 younger and 10 of 24 older children touched or 
opened one or both boxes. The children were scored for the number of seconds 
that passed before they touched the pretend or the neutral box (Harris et al., 
1991). 
A three-way ANOVA was examined for age (younger and older) X 
creature (rabbit and monster) X box (neutral and creature). A main effect of box 
was revealed, meaning that the children approached the pretend box more 
quickly than the neutral box. Children's behavior did not seem to be affected by 
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the identity of the pretend creature, yet they approached the pretend box more 
quickly and touched and opened it more than they did the neutral box (Harris et 
al., 1991). 
Questioning after the experimenter's return revealed most children replied 
honestly as to whether they had remained seated or not, whether they had 
looked in a box, and if so, which one. Responses to Question 9 were obtained 
from 20 of 24 younger and all older children. Equally, 11 from each group 
admitted wondering if the imagined creature actually was inside the box (Harris 
et al., 1991). 
Responses to question 5 were compared with responses to question 9. 
Comparisons show children either gave consistently credulous or skeptical 
answers to both, or they gave a skeptical response to question five and a 
credulous response to question 9 (Harris et al., 1991). 
Lastly, the majority of children in both groups (14 of 20 younger, 19 of 24 
older) denied that pretending could generate a real creature. However, six 
younger and five older children believed they could generate a real creature by 
pretending. Some children (five younger and five older) believed they could not 
generate a real creature by pretending because they lacked the appropriate 
magical skills (Harris et al., 1991). 
Results of questioning revealed some magical, non-realist thinking. Prior 
to the experimenter's absence the children insisted the creature was only 
pretend. However, almost half admitted to wondering whether there really was a 
creature in the box (Harris et al., 1991). 
Rationale 
Subbotskii (1985) has studied children's perceptions of unusual 
phenomena and their beliefs surrounding natural cause and effect. Subbotskii 
claims this topic has mainly been studied in terms of "verbal" thinking in 
children's judgments. Young children's ideas of cause and effect at a nonverbal 
level of assimilation of physical phenomena have limited research findings. In 
addition, researchers have been in disagreement about the origin of infantile 
"animism" and how it relates to the properties involved in scientific thinking 
(Subbotskii, 1985). 
The study of the development of the appearance-reality distinction in 
children has gained little recognition in past years. However, it is important to 
study for several reasons. Flavell et al. (1989) suggest the distinction is 
ecologically significant. By this statement they mean the appearance-reality 
distinction takes many forms in daily living, occurs in many situations, and can 
have serious consequences for our lives. A second reason to study the 
development of the appearance-reality distinction is its apparent acquisition by 
virtually every normal human being. Thus, it is quite possible that the distinction 
is a universal milestone through which all people progress. Lastly, Flavell et al. 
(1989) assert the acquisition of the appearance-reality distinction is part of the 
larger development of the child's knowledge about the mind. 
Similar to the appearance-reality distinction, the fantasy-reality distinction 
factors in the element of the supernatural. The need for research in this area 
closely resembles the arguments posed above. In addition, there is a 
phenomenon which takes place in the fantasy-reality distinction in that what 
children say contradicts what they do. Young children are often truly scared of 
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creatures such as ghosts and monsters which they have claimed are not real. 
The purpose of the present study will be to replicate and extend Experiment 4 as 
conducted by Harris et al. (1991). In the series of experiments conducted by 
Harris et al. (1991), each subsequent experiment was an improvement of the 
one prior. Experiment 4 explored the original hypothesis that certain forms of 
imaginary creatures may arouse fear. However, the fourth experiment explored 
the research question in a manner which eliminated possible demand 
characteristics of the examiner and allowed the children to see that both boxes 
were empty at the outset of the experiment. The fourth experiment came about 
in attempt to eliminate the possible confounds which may have effected the 
results of the three prior experiments. For this reason, the procedures used in 
Experiment 4 were utilized in the present study. 
The present study varied from the fourth experiment conducted by Harris 
et al. (1991) in some ways. The subjects utilized were American children, as 
opposed to British. In addition, a larger sample of children was obtained than in 
the original study (36 vs. 24 younger and 33 vs. 24 older children, total N=69). A 
slight addition to the original script was made at the outset of each interview. 
Children's previous experiences with pretending were explored by asking them 
some simple questions. To code the videotapes of the children during the 
experimenter's absence, a coder blind to age was employed. In addition to 
recording the response time of the children, the coder also categorized the 
population of nonresponding children into one of six groups. The categories 
were Obedient, Scared, Uninterested/Don't Care, Confused, Certain Box is 
Empty, and Unsure of Novel Situation. The purpose of the categories was to 
incorporate the group of children who failed to investigate the contents of the 
boxes during the experimenter's absence. Since the response rate in the Harris 
et al. (1991) Experiment 4 was roughly 50%, it was decided to examine possible 
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reasons for such a low rate of overt responding. The coder also rated the 
behavior of the experimenter to assure consistency from one child to the next. 
Lastly, at the conclusion of each interview, the children were debriefed as to the 
actual contents of both boxes. 
Based on the original study conducted by Harris et al. (1991), four phases 
of questioning were explored. The first phase of questioning arose with respect 
to questions 1 through 4 (questions designed to check memory for color, 
friendliness, desires, and location of pretend creature). Does age and/or 
creature condition effect children's responses to the memory questions? Based 
on the results of Harris et al. (1991), an interaction between age and creature 
was expected. 
The next research question pertained to children's response to question 5 
(reality status of the creature). Will a significant number of younger or older 
children respond to question 5 in a skeptical (creature is not real) manner? In 
response to question 5, it was expected that a significant number of both 
younger and older children would indicate the pretend creature was not real, 
based on Harris et al. (1991). 
The third phase of questioning concerned the children's behavior in the 
absence of the experimenter. When left alone, will children's age, creature 
condition, or choice of pretend or neutral box significantly effect the time 
elapsing before they touch one or both boxes? Based on Harris et al. (1991), a 
main effect of box was expected, measuring the number of seconds transpiring 
from experimenter absence until the child touched one or both boxes. A second 
question in this phase deviated somewhat from the original study conducted by 
Harris et al. (1991). According to the results of Harris et al. (1991), only about 
half of the children in both age groups responded to either one or both boxes 
during the experimenter's absence. The question remaining was, "What about 
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the children who did not respond while left alone?" To address this question, six 
no-response categories were developed and the children who did not respond 
were assigned to one of these categories. The question is can nonresponding 
children's behavior during the experimenter's absence be significantly accounted 
for by one of the six categories? 
The fourth and final phase of questioning arose from the interview after 
the experimenter returned. Upon the experimenter's return, children were asked 
whether they actually wondered about the existence of the pretend creature 
(question 9). Will children's responses to question 9 be consistent with their 
responses to question 5, which was asked prior to the experimenter's departure? 
It was expected that children would answer consistently on both questions, or 
they would shift from a skeptical reply on question 5 (insisting creature is not 
real), to a credulous reply on question 9 (admitting they wondered about the 
creatures existence). Lastly, in regards to question 11 (would there suddenly 
be a creature in the box if you pretended very hard?), will a significant number of 
younger and older children believe a creature can be generated through 
pretense? Based on Harris et al. (1991), it was expected that a significant 




The subjects were 69 children from various schools and daycare centers 
in central Kentucky and Tennessee. Thirty-six younger children (age 3-0 to 4-
11) and 33 older children (age 5-0 to 6-7) were used as participants. Based on 
school settings, 45% of the sample attended a private daycare facility, while the 
remaining 55 % attended public schools. Ethnic breakdown of the sample 
revealed 75% were Caucasian, 13% were African American, and 2% Other. 
Four of the younger children, and one in the older group, were excluded from the 
study-leaving 32 children in each age group. These children were excluded 
because they missed three or more out of four of the memory questions. 
Children with obvious disabilities were also excluded from the study. 
Parental permission was obtained for all subjects. In addition, all 
participants received a follow-up letter to take to their parents upon completion 
of the interview. Copies of the permission and follow-up letters can be found in 
Appendix A and B, respectively. 
Procedure 
Depending on the location of the facility, the interview took place in an 
available room, with as few distractions as possible. Two black boxes, 
measuring approximately one yard along each side (40 in. X 40 in. X 35 in.), 
were placed on the floor in the middle of the room about one yard apart, facing 
two child size chairs. Both boxes were free standing and readily visible to a 
child seated in one of the chairs. A video camera was inconspicuously placed 
on the floor, behind a cardboard screen, in a position to record the child sitting in 
the chair, the two boxes, and any of the child's movements toward the boxes. 
2 0 
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Half of the children in each age group were assigned to a pretend 
monster condition and half to a pretend rabbit condition. Each child was brought 
into the room individually and seated, some distance from the boxes, next to the 
examiner. The examiner began the interview by asking each child about their 
background with pretend games. The first question was, "Have you ever played 
pretend games?" If the child responded yes, the examiner asked, "What kind of 
pretend games have you played?" The experimenter then asked the child to 
look in the boxes to see if there was anything inside. When the child agreed that 
both boxes were empty, the experimenter said, "It's okay that the boxes are 
empty because we are going to play a game of pretend. I'll bet you're good at 
pretending. Do you like bunny rabbits (monsters)? I want you to pretend there's 
a bunny rabbit (monster) in that box," (experimenter pointed to one of the two 
boxes at random). The experimenter continued, "Now pretend the rabbit 
(monster) in the box is a nice, white, friendly rabbit (a horrible, mean, black 
monster). Pretend he's sitting in the box and he wants to come out so you can 
pet him (come out and chase you). When describing the monster and rabbit, the 
experimenter used appropriate voice intonation. The monster was described in 
a deep, dramatic tone of voice; the rabbit was described in a soft, friendly tone of 
voice. 
The experimenter then asked five questions to check whether the child 
had both understood and remembered the instructions. Questions one through 
four concerned the (1) color, (2) friendliness, (3) desires, and (4) location of the 
pretend creature. In question five, children were asked about the reality status 
of the creature. (5) "Now is there really a nice, friendly, white bunny that wants 
to be petted (a horrible, mean, black monster that wants to come out and chase 
you), or are you just pretending?" 
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The child was not corrected for wrong answers to any of the memory 
questions. However, children responding incorrectly to three or more of these 
questions were eliminated from the study. The experimenter then left the room, 
telling the child she was going to get some stickers she had forgotten. Before 
leaving the room, the experimenter asked the child to wait for her and added 
that, although it was not necessary to stay sitting down, the child should stay in 
the room to answer a few more questions upon the experimenter's return. 
Before finally leaving, the experimenter asked the child whether it was okay, and 
did not leave the room if the child said he/she did not want her to leave. 
The experimenter then left the room for two minutes, during which time 
the child was filmed by the video camera. Whenever possible, the experimenter 
was in a position outside the room to observe whether or not the children 
touched or opened the box(es), without being visible to the child. When the 
experimenter re-entered the room she asked the child the following questions: 
(6) "What did you do while I was gone? Did you stay sitting or did you stand 
up?" (7) "And did you look inside one of the boxes?" Children who responded 
during the experimenter's absence were asked, (8) "Which box did you look 
inside?" and, (9) "What did you think when you went to open the box? Did you 
think to yourself, 'I wonder if there's a nice, white bunny rabbit (horrible, mean, 
black monster) inside'?" If the child denied looking inside the boxes, he/she was 
asked a set of non-responding (NR) questions. The experimenter asked (8NR) 
"Why didn't you look inside?" and (9NR) "Were you sure there was nothing 
inside the box or did you wonder whether there was a monster inside?" Lastly, 
nonresponders were asked, (10NR) "Were you thinking anything else?" Finally, 
regardless of whether or not the child responded, the experimenter pointed to 
the unused box and asked (11) "What about that box there? What if you 
pretended very, very, hard that there was a monster (rabbit) inside, what would 
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happen? Would there suddenly be a monster (rabbit) inside the box if you 
pretended very hard? Why? (Why not?)" 
Upon conclusion of the interview, the children were debriefed as to the 
actual contents of the boxes. The experimenter said, "Okay, let's go together 
and open up each box. Let's see for sure that both boxes are empty." The 
examiner and child approached the pretend box first. The examiner said, "Let's 
look in this box first. Remember, we pretended there was a rabbit (monster) in 
this box?" The examiner opened the box and looked inside first, then 
encouraged the child to look inside. The examiner said, "See? It's empty 
because we were just pretending. Now let's look inside the other box." The 
examiner and child approached the neutral box and both looked inside. The 
examiner said, "See? This box is empty too." The children were then thanked 
for playing the pretend game, given a sticker for their cooperation, and escorted 
back to their classrooms. During the interview, any child exhibiting signs of 
distress was debriefed as to the reality of the contents of the boxes and was 
excused from the study. The data collection protocols for the monster and rabbit 
conditions can be found in Appendix C and D, respectively. 
As the data were collected, the videotapes were coded by an individual 
blind to the purpose of the study. Coder objectivity was established on a pilot 
run of four subjects. Tests of interrater agreement revealed no mean differences 
between coders. The coder watched the tapes and recorded the amount of time 
elapsing before the children touched or opened either box. 
Children who did not respond to either box were assigned to one of six 
No-Response categories. Prior to data collection, categories were developed 
which attempted to capture any possible behavior of the nonresponding children. 
These categories were developed through consultation with professionals in the 
field of child development. At the outset, the categories were Shy, Obedient, 
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Scared, Uninterested/Don't Care, Confused, and Other. There were no children 
evidencing behavior normally characterized as Shy therefore, this category was 
eliminated. However, from the Other category came the two separate categories 
of Unsure of Novel Situation and Certain the Box is Empty. Assignment was 
based on the children's behavior(s) while left alone and/or their verbal 
responses when the experimenter returned. Table 1 describes categories and 
sample behavior/comment characteristic of each. 
Interrater agreement was also obtained on the behavior of the 
experimenter, based on a random sub-sample of those children interviewed 
(N=7). Once again, tests of interrater agreement revealed no mean differences 
between coders. The experimenter's behavior was rated throughout the data 
collection process, to assure consistency with all children. Copies of the Video 
Review and Experimenter Consistency Rating forms can be found in Appendix E 
and F, respectively. 
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Table 1 
No-Response Categories and Sample Behavior/Comments Characteristic of the Category 
Category Behaviors/Comments 
1. Obedient When asked why they didn't look in box, children indicated it 
was because the experimenter didn't tell them to. 
2. Scared Child would stand up and quickly sit back down. When asked 
why they didn't look in the box, children would say it was 
because there was, "A monster in there!" 
3. Uninterested/Don't Care Children quickly got out of their chairs to investigate other things 
in the room, and did so for the duration of the experimenter's 
absence. 
4. Confused When asked why she didn't look in the box, the child responded, 
"Well, is that how you play the game?" Also, had to repeat 
many questions before getting an answer that fit the question. 
5. Unsure of Novel Situation Children stayed seated and looked around the room, appearing 
somewhat nervous. When asked why they didn't look in box, 
most said they weren't sure why they didn't look. 
6. Certain the Box is Empty Children either stayed seated or walked nonchalantly around the 
room. When asked why they didn't look in the box, most said it 
was because there was nothing in it. 
Results 
At the outset of each interview, children were asked about their previous 
experiences playing pretend games. Children's responses to these questions 
("Have you ever played pretend games?" and "What kind of pretend games have 
you played?") were very interesting. Most of the younger children indicated they 
had played pretend games. These children reported playing such pretend 
games as Jurassic Park, dress-up, Lion King, Power Rangers, and school. 
Some of the younger children also said they played the pretend games of Hide 
and Seek, Hi-Ho Cherrio, volleyball, soccer, London Bridge is Falling Down, and 
the ABC game. While some children had an accurate grasp of what it means to 
play pretend games, many children generalized board games and sports as 
pretend games also. Older children who admitted to playing pretend games 
gave more accurate examples, such as Power Rangers and house. One child 
gave a very original type of pretend game. He called it "Months," and when 
asked how to play he reported, "Well, say I'm January, then I pretend I'm a 
snowman." Still, there were a few older children who also reported playing 
such pretend games as Duck, Duck Goose and Hide and Seek. The results of 
these questions are considered anecdotal information, as explained early on, 
and children's responses were not analyzed in a statistical manner. To answer 
the research questions, the data were analyzed in the following manner: 
Questions 1-4. 
The memory questions 1-4 were designed to determine whether 
children had remembered the experimenter's instructions. Would age or 
creature condition significantly effect children's responses to these memory 
questions? Based on the average number of correct responses, out of four, a 
26 
2 7 
two-way ANOVA of age X creature revealed no effects of age or creature 
condition and no interaction between the two variables F (1, 60) = 2.96, £ < .09. 
Regardless of condition, younger children were just as accurate as older 
children when answering the memory questions. 
Question 5. 
Question 5 was asked just prior to the experimenter leaving the room. 
The child was asked whether there was really a pretend creature in the box, or 
whether they were just pretending. The children's responses to the question of 
the reality of the creature were examined with chi squares for each age group. 
Almost all children alleged the creature was not real. Among the younger 
children, 29 (out of 32) indicated they were just pretending %2 (1, N=32) = 10.56, 
£ < .01, and among the older children, 32 (out of 32) indicated they were only 
pretending y} (1, N=32) = 16, £ < .001. 
Behavior in the absence of the experimenter. 
Four (out of 32) younger and nine (out of 32) older children either 
touched or opened one or both boxes. Children were scored for the number of 
seconds that elapsed before they touched either the pretend box or the neutral 
box. Children failing to touch one or both boxes were assigned a score of 120 
seconds (equivalent to the entire period of experimenter's absence). 
A three-way ANOVA of age X creature X choice of box was conducted, 
using a mixed design with two between groups factors and one within groups 
factor. This ANOVA revealed no significant main effects or interactions E (1, 60) 
= 3.73, £ < .058. To investigate only the differences between the pretend and 
neutral boxes, a t-test for paired samples was conducted. This test revealed a 
significant difference between the pretend box and the neutral box. Children 
approaching the pretend box (M = 101.5, £D = 39.93) did so significantly more 
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quickly than children approaching the neutral box (M= 105.67, SD = 36.26), t 
(63) = 1.92, p < .05, one-tailed). 
No-Response Categories 
Based on the original study, a low rate of responding to the boxes was 
anticipated. To incorporate the population of nonresponding children, they were 
observed and categorized into one of six no-response categories. The 
categories were Obedient, Scared, Uninterested/Don't Care, Confused, Unsure 
of Novel Situation, and Certain the Box is Empty. Table 2 summarizes the 
significant No-Response categories by condition and age. Further analysis was 
conducted to determine in which condition the age differences were most 
prevalent for those children appearing scared. It was revealed that there were 
significantly more children in the monster condition exhibiting behaviors 
characteristic of fear than those in the rabbit condition %2 (1, N=25) = 4.96, p < 
.026. 
Interview after experimenter's return. 
To determine if children's responses to question 9 were consistent with 
their responses to the early question 5, a sign test was performed. Question 5 
was asked prior to the experimenter leaving the room ("Is there really a 
rabbit/monster in the box, or are you just pretending?"), and question 9 was 
asked upon her return ("Did you think there was nothing in the box, or did you 
think there was a rabbit/monster?"). Thirty-three children were consistent in 
giving either a credulous or skeptical reply from question 5 to question 9. Thirty 
children went from being skeptical about the presence of a creature, to believing 
a creature actually existed, and lastly, one child went from being credulous, to 
being skeptical (a < .000, by two-tailed sign test). 
Finally, Question 11 asked children if they believed a creature could be 
generated through pretending. To determine whether a significant number of 
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Table 2 
Percentages of Children Within Significant No-Response Categories, by 
Condition and Age 
Monster Rabbit 
Category Yes No Yes No X 2 (1 ,51 ) 
Scared 76 24 7.7 92.3 
/V 1 T 
24.50**** 
Uninterested/Don't Care 00 100 23.1 76.9 6.54** 
Unsure of Situation 00 100 26.9 73.1 7.80*** 
Scared 
Certain Box is Empty 
Younger Older 
Yes No Yes No x2(1,51) 
53.6 46.4 26.1 73.9 3.94* 
7.1 92.9 34.8 65.2 6.12** 
*£ < .05. **£ < .01. ***£ < .005. ****p < .001. 
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younger and older children believed a creature could be generated through 
pretense, a two-way classification chi square was conducted. Twenty-five (out 
of 32) younger children and 16 (out of 32) older children believed a creature 
could be produced through pretending x2 (1, N=64) = 5.5, £ < .019. 
Discussion 
Discussion of the results focuses first on the research questions and how 
they were answered. Secondly, strengths and limitations of the present study 
are discussed. Suggestions for future research are made, and finally a brief 
general discussion summarizes the findings of the present study. 
Research Questions 
Most of the research questions and hypotheses were based on the results 
of the original study conducted by Harris et al. (1991). Table 3 compares the 
results found by Harris et al. (1991) with those of the present study. As can be 
seen, the present study supports the research of Harris et al. (1991), although 
there are some interesting differences. 
The first phase of questioning explored children's memory for the 
characteristics of the pretend creatures. With respect to the memory questions 
1 through 4, it was predicted there would be an interaction between age and 
creature condition. This expected result was not substantiated in the present 
study, and in fact, there were no effects and no interactions between any of the 
variables. 
In reference to children's responses to the memory questions 1 through 4, 
it was decided prior to data collection to eliminate children who missed three or 
more of the memory questions. The rationale for their removal was that children 
who were unable to remember the qualities of the pretend creature were not 
necessarily the most credible of subjects. However, by eliminating these 
children it was no longer possible to compare findings of the two-way ANOVA 
(age X creature) to that conducted by Harris et al. (1991). In the present study, 
no differences between groups were found. This outcome would be expected, 
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Table 3 
Comparison of Results Between Harris et al. (1991) and the Present Study 
Question Harris et al. (1991) 
1. Does age and/or condition 
significantly effect responses 
to memory questions 1-4? 
2. Will a significant number 
of younger or older children 
respond to question 5 in a 
skeptical manner? 
3. Will child's age, condition, 
or choice of box significantly 
effect time elapsing before 
touching either box? 
Yes. Interaction between 
age and creature. 
Yes. Significant number 
of both younger and older 
indicated pretend creature 
was not real. 
Yes. Main effect of box. 
Present Study Agreement? 
No. No interactions No. 
or main effects. 
Yes. Significant number Yes. 
of both younger and older 
indicated pretend creature 
was not real. 
Yes. Main effect of box. Yes. 
CJ 
ro 
Table 3 (cont'd) 
Comparison of Results Between Harris et al. (1991^ and the Present Study 
Question Harris et al. (1991) Present Study Agreement? 
4. Can non-responding 
children's behavior be 
significantly accounted for 
by any of the six categories? 
5. Will children be consistent 
in responding from question 5 to 
question 9? 
6. Will a significant number of 
children believe a creature can 
be generated through pretense? 
Children were either consistent, 
or shifted from skeptical reply 
to credulous reply. 
No. Significant number in each 
age group denied pretending 
could generate real creature. 
Yes. Significant numbers of 
children were in the categories 
of Scared, Uninterested/Don't Care, 
Unsure of Situation, and Certain 
Box is Empty. 
Children were either consistent, 
or shifted from skeptical reply 
to credulous reply. 
Yes. Significant number in each 
age group believed pretending 




since the children who would provide the most variance were eliminated from the 
study. 
Of the five children who were eliminated from the present study, four were 
in the younger group, and one was in the older group. By condition, two of the 
younger children were in the rabbit condition, and the remaining two younger 
and one older child were in the monster condition. Of those in the rabbit 
condition, the children's responses indicated apparent confusion about the 
purpose of their visit with the examiner. Most interesting were the incorrect 
responses of those children in the monster condition. It seemed to the examiner, 
as well as the video tape coder, that these children were scared at the 
suggestion of a monster in the box, and they developed their own description of 
the creature to cope with such thoughts. For instance, the children responded 
by describing the monster as friendly, as opposed to mean, and some added the 
detail "He's my friend." When asked why the monster wanted to come out of the 
box, two of the three children indicated it was to play. To sum up the actions of 
these children, while they were disqualified from the study for incorrect 
responses, their behavior indicated they were taking the job of pretending very 
seriously, and perhaps gave incorrect responses on purpose, to alleviate 
possible fear arousal. 
The next phase of questioning pertained to children's responses to 
question 5 ("Is there really a monster/rabbit in the box, or are you just 
pretending?"). As predicted, a significant number of younger and older children 
indicated they were just pretending about the reality of the creature. Here, at a 
verbal level, children made a clear distinction between reality and fantasy. 
The third phase of questioning concerned children's behavior in the 
absence of the experimenter. The first research question in this phase 
concerned those children who responded during the experimenter's absence. 
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The question asked whether or not children's age, creature condition, or 
response choice of pretend or neutral box would significantly effect the time 
elapsing before they touched one or both boxes. The total number of 
responders in the present study was 13 (ten male, three female), which is 
approximately 20% of the total sample, as opposed to an approximate 50% 
responding rate in the original study. A main effect of box was predicted and 
was substantiated in the present study. Harris et al. (1991) obtained a main 
effect of box by a three-way ANOVA. This ANOVA was replicated in the present 
study and revealed no significant results. However, when investigating just the 
mean differences between time elapsing before touching the pretend box versus 
the neutral box, a significant difference was found. Just as in the original study, 
children approached the pretend box significantly more quickly than the neutral 
box, and their behavior was not affected by the identity of the pretend creature. 
The group of nonresponding children was incorporated into this phase of 
the present study. In the original experiment conducted by Harris et al. (1991), 
about 50% of the sample did not respond to the boxes during the experimenter's 
absence, and were not incorporated into the results. However, the 
nonresponders are deemed quite relevant to a study of this nature. Inferences 
can be made about the children's behavior during the absence, and their self-
reports afterwards, which may indicate their thoughts and beliefs about 
imaginary creatures. The nonresponders in the present study comprise 
approximately 80% of the sample, making it all the more important to incorporate 
their behavior into the results. . When analyzing the categories by condition, a 
significant number of younger and older children in the monster condition 
behaved as if they were Scared. Behaviors exhibited by these children 
consisted of such things as walking cautiously up to the box, but not touching or 
opening it, and staying seated and watching the box closely. Children who told 
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the examiner after her return that they did not open the box because there was a 
monster inside were also categorized as Scared. While children were able to 
indicate they were just pretending, the suggestion of something frightening in the 
box seemed to arouse real fear. In the rabbit condition, significant numbers of 
children exhibited behaviors best characterized as Uninterested/Don't Care and 
Unsure of Novel Situation. Most of the children deemed Uninterested/Don't 
Care wandered around the room and investigated other things besides the two 
boxes in front of them. Perhaps the suggestion of a rabbit was not intriguing 
enough to sustain the attention of these children. Most of those children 
categorized as Unsure of Novel Situation remained seated and looked around 
the room, seeming somewhat nervous. Several of these children also would 
stand up for a few seconds then sit back down. It was evident to the observer 
that these children were not quite sure about what they were to be doing during 
the examiner's absence. Based on age, a significant number of younger and 
older children behaved as if they were Certain the Box was Empty. Children in 
this category exhibited such actions as remaining seated or nonchalantly 
strolling around the room, as well as indicating to the examiner upon her return 
that they didn't look because there was nothing there. 
The fourth and final phase of questioning examined children's consistency 
in responding before and after the examiner's absence. While about half of the 
children remained consistent in their replies, the remaining half (with the 
exception of one child) went from just pretending to believing there was 
something in the box. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that children 
would either remain consistent or they would shift from a skeptical reply on 
question 5 to a credulous reply on question 9. 
Lastly, based on Harris et al. (1991), it was predicted a significant number 
of children would deny pretending could generate a real creature. This 
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prediction was not substantiated in the present study, and in fact, the exact 
opposite was found. A significant number of children believed a creature would 
suddenly exist if one pretended hard enough. When asked why, many children 
made reference to acts of magic and magical thinking. By the end of the 
interview, many children no longer made a clear distinction between reality and 
fantasy at a verbal level. Evidently, the issue is not simply that what children say 
contradicts what they do. In fact, what they say is often contradictory from one 
minute to the next, at least as it pertains to imaginary creatures and pretending. 
Strengths and Limitations 
The present study possesses some significant strengths over its original 
counterpart. As an extension of the original, the present study not only 
increased the sample size, but added some valuable characteristics to the study. 
First, the observation of the videotapes by an unbiased coder assured objectivity 
in timing and rating of the children's behaviors. In addition, the implementation 
of an Experimenter Consistency Rating increased standardization among 
subjects. 
Perhaps the most valuable improvement of the present study was the 
incorporation of the nonresponders to the analysis of the experiment. Through 
development of the no-response categories, the behavior of nonresponders was 
quantified into relevant and significant outcomes. The fact that so few children 
did respond in the present study made the existence of these categories even 
more valuable. 
While the incorporation of the nonresponders was a valuable addition to 
the present study, the low number of responders was also a limitation. It 
becomes difficult to compare the present findings with those of Harris et al. 
(1991) when there is such a gap between percentages of responders in each 
study. 
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When examining limitations to the internal validity of the present study, 
several factors come into play. First, the fact that the original study was done in 
a different culture could be contributing to the differences in results. Perhaps 
the British culture is less inhibited than the American culture, possibly 
accounting for the larger number of responders in the original study. Second, it 
is not known at what time of the year Harris et al. (1991) conducted their 
interviews with the children. The present study was conducted in May, at the 
end of the school year. At this time, even the youngest of the subjects had been 
exposed to almost a full year of socialization within the school setting. Related 
and also unknown to the researcher is the curriculum of the schools in which 
Harris et al. (1991) collected their data. The structure of the classrooms could 
have an effect on the behavior of the children with the examiner. Certain early 
childhood programs may encourage more exploration of one's environment, 
while others reinforce children who stay seated and follow directions. 
The Experimenter Consistency Rating, while a valuable concept, could be 
improved. The experimenter behaviors rated in the present study were not 
defined in enough detail to derive any difference between the raters. There 
were virtually no differences in the ratings of two coders, perhaps in part due to 
the limited scope of the rating scale. 
Recommendations for Future Research 
Future researchers may wish to obtain a larger sample of children, in an 
effort to achieve a more equal percentage of responders and nonresponders. 
Another option would be to sample children until there are enough of each, 
responders and nonresponders, to conduct a feasible analysis. 
The present study was conducted in school settings. For this reason, 
availability of space was not always optimal. Future researchers will want to 
acquire the least stimulating environment possible, or try to eliminate as many 
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existing distracters as possible within the interview setting. In addition, when 
setting up the video camera, placement should be made in front or facing the 
children whenever possible, as inconspicuously as possible. In the present 
study, the camera was placed behind the children. While this location was 
considered less conspicuous, the children's facial expressions were often 
missed from behind. A one-way mirror would be optimal, if available. 
The value of the videotapes should not be overlooked. By videotaping 
the children, it is possible to view and review their behavior as many times as 
necessary. For children whose behavior was not always clear cut, this factor 
became almost invaluable to the accuracy of the results. 
Future researchers may also wish to utilize those children who give 
incorrect answers to the memory questions. Children who missed three or more 
of these questions were disqualified from the study, and in fact, the interview 
was discontinued. However, upon review of those who fell into this group, 
several gave very intriguing responses. It is speculated that these children were 
pretending so hard they responded incorrectly to cope with the fear arousal 
which was taking place. Future researchers may wish to at least continue the 
interview and then decide later whether or not the subject is a credible one. 
General Discussion 
In summary, at the outset of each interview, children were skeptical about 
the existence of a creature in a box. However, a significant number of children 
in the monster condition then exhibited behaviors characteristic of a child who is 
scared. In the rabbit condition, significant numbers of children appeared 
uninterested or unsure about the situation. Following, children reported that 
they believed there was something in the box, and they also believed a creature 
could be generated through pretending. 
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Based on the works of past researchers, it has been found that young 
children are able to differentiate real from nonreal items (Harris et al., 1991; 
Wellman and Estes, 1986). The present researcher examined this claim as it 
pertained to supernatural imagined entities. What seems to have emerged is 
that young children do not always possess a firm barrier between reality and 
fantasy as it pertains to any form of imagined entity, supernatural or not. Based 
on children's responses to background questions of pretending, many children 
considered board games and sports as pretend. It may be that young children 
are at a developmental level where they understand the difference between what 
is real and not real, but are not so clear about what it means to really "pretend." 
Therefore, when asked the question, "Is there really a monster in the box, or are 
you just pretending?," they know there is not really a monster in the box, and by 
process of elimination, they are "just pretending." 
An alternative explanation is that when children begin to imagine 
creatures such as monsters and rabbits in a box, they begin to wonder if there is 
truly such a creature there, and they are unable to completely rule out the 
possibility. Hence, the subjective likelihood that certain fantasy creatures might 
exist is increased by the child's imagination (Harris et al., 1991). This 
phenomenon takes place, regardless of whether the creature is frightening or 
harmless. 
While no substantial conclusions can be drawn from the small group of 
responding children in the present study, the present replication-extension is 
considered a success. Granted certain conditions varied from the original, yet 
the variations make the present results all the more generalizable to the original 
study because the basic tenets of Harris et al. (1991) study have been 
supported. Children still seem to appear fearful of things they claim do not exist, 
and they admit to wondering if harmless creatures exist that they know were not 
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present moments before. The one thing which seems certain is that young 




Department of Piychology 
WESTERN 
KENTUCKY 
UNIVERSITY Bowling Green, KY 42101 302-743-2695 
Dear Parents: 
Your child is invited to participate in a study of magical thinking. This study is 
being conducted by Elizabeth Easton and Dr. Elizabeth Jones of Western 
Kentucky University, in cooperation with your child's school. The aim of our 
study is to better understand children's perceptions of reality and fantasy. We 
hope to provide information as to when children can easily distinguish between 
fantasy and reality. 
The project will be conducted in one short session at your child's school, in 
cooperation with your child's teacher. The session will last approximately 15 
minutes. Your child will participate in an individual interview in which several 
questions about real and imaginary characters will be asked. There are no right 
or wrong answers to these questions. Your child's answers will be recorded and 
kept confidential by our research staff. Within the interview room there will be 
two boxes. Your child will be asked to pretend there is either a real or imaginary 
character inside one of the boxes. The experimenter will leave the room for two 
minutes, during which time your child will be videotaped to see if they look inside 
the box. The experimenter will not leave the room if your child objects. 
We emphasize that your child's participation in this project is entirely voluntary. 
If you or your child decide not to participate, it will have no negative outcome for 
you or your child in any way. Your child may refuse to answer any question and 
may withdraw from the study at any time. If your child evidences any distress, 
the interview will be terminated immediately. All information collected in this 
study will be kept strictly confidential and is accessible only to the project staff. 
All results will be reported in terms of group averages, and no children will ever 
be identified by name. If you wish, group information will be available in written 
reports of the results. 
(See reverse side...) 
The Spirit Makes the Master 
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We hope that you will allow your child to take part in our study. We promise to 
do our best to make it fun for your child, and to schedule our sessions in 
cooperation with your child's teacher. Please fill in your child's name, your 
child's date of birth, and your child's teacher's name on the form below. To 
indicate your consent for your child's participation in the individual interview, 
sign your name and fill in the date below. Please return the form to your child's 
teacher, so the teacher will know you received the form. Thank you for your 
help. 
Sincerely, 
Ski^t i i t 
Elizabeth Easton 
School Psychologist Intern 
QLtjjibdh <f\. (jpa&Qs 
Elizabeth Jones, Ph.D. 
Assistant Professor 
of Psychology 
Western Kentucky University 
Participant Consent Form 
Child's name: Teacher. 
Child's date of birth: 
I have read the information provided about this study, and give my consent for 
my child to participate in the individual interview that is part of the study 
conducted by Elizabeth Easton and Dr. Elizabeth Jones of Western Kentucky 
University. I understand that I may withdraw my child from the study at any time 
without penalty. 
I DO give consent for my child to participate in this study. 




Department of Ptychology 
WESTERN 
KENTUCKY 
UNIVERSITY Bowfcng Green, KY 42101 302-745-2695 
Dear Parents: 
Some time ago you gave permission for your child to participate in a research 
study about magical thinking in young children. Today your child participated in 
that study. Your child was asked to pretend about the contents of a box. Some 
children were asked to pretend there was a monster in the box, while others 
were asked to pretend there was a rabbit in the box Your child was assigned to 
his/her group at random and was interviewed individually by the examiner. Upon 
conclusion of the interview, your child was reminded that we were only 
pretending and was shown that the boxes were empty. Your child was thanked 
for playing such a good game of "pretend" and given a sticker for their help and 
cooperation. 
Your child may discuss the experience with you sometime in the days to come. 
Your child may have questions as to the reality of such supernatural creatures 
as monsters, or he/she may just recount the event of the interview and how they 
may have looked for a monster in a box Whatever the case, providing your 
child with reassuring and honest answers to his/her questions in regards to the 
non-reality of such creatures is recommended. 
A summary of the results of this study will be provided to you as soon as they 
are available. Thank you again for allowing your child to participate. 
Sincerely, 
Elizabeth Easton, 
School Psychology Intern 
Elizabeth Jones, Ph.D. 
Assistant Professor of Psychology 
The Spirit Makes the Master 
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CHILD'S NAME GENDER M F 
SCHOOL TEACHER 
DATE OF TESTING 
DATE OF BIRTH 
AGE PRETEND BOX L R 
BACKGROUND 
A. "Have you ever played pretend games? Y N 
B. What kind of pretend games have you played?" 
STEPS 
A. Child looks in both boxes to see if anything is inside. When child understands both are 
empty, proceed to step B. 
B. "It's okay that the boxes are empty because we're going to play a game of pretend. in bet 
you're good at pretending. Do you like monsters? I want you to pretend there's a monster in that 
box. 
Now, pretend the monster in the box is a horrible, mean, black, monster. Pretend he's sitting in 
the box and he wants to come out and chase you." 
C. MEMORY CHECK (Do not correct wrong answers to these questions) 
1. "Now tell me what color the monster is. black 
other 
2. Is the monster friendly or mean? mean 
friendly 
3. Why does the monster want to come out of the box? to chase me 
other 
4. Which box is the monster in? correct 
incorrect 
5. Now is there really a horrible, mean, black monster that wants to come out and chase you, or 
are you just pretending?" pretending 
real 
D. EXPERIMENTER ABSENCE 
*l have a sticker for you, but I left it in the other room. I want you to wait here for me because I 
want to ask you some more questions when I get back. You don't have to stay in your chair 
while I'm gone, but please don't leave this room, okay? Is it okay if I leave for a minute?" 
If YES • leave room for 2 minutes. 
If No - look inside both boxes with the child to prove they are empty and attempt to leave once 
more. If NO again - reassure child and discontinue interview. 
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E. EXPERIMENTER RETURN 
6. "What did you do while I was gone? Did you stay sitting or did you stand up? 
stayed sitting stood up 
7. Did you look inside one of the boxes?" V N 
RESPONDERS 
8. "Which box did you look inside? pretend neutral 
9. What did you think when you went to open the box? Did you think there was nothing inside or 
did you think to yourself, 'I wonder if there's a horrible, mean, black monster inside*?* 
nothing monster 
NON-RESPONDERS 
8NR. "Why didn't you look in the box? 
9NR. Were you sure there was nothing inside the box or did you wonder whether there was a 
monster inside? 
10NR. Were you thinking anything else?" 
No Response categories: Shy Obedient Scared 
Don't Confused Other 
Care 
POINT TO THE UNUSED BOX AND SAY, 
11. "What about that box there? What if you pretended very, very hard that there was a rabbit 
inside, what would happen? Would there suddenly be a rabbit inside the box if you pretended 
very hard? Why or why not?" 
F. DEBRIEFING 
Say, "Okay, lefs go together and open up each box. Let's see for sure that both boxes are 
empty." The examiner and child approach the pretend box first Say, "Let's look in this box first. 
Remember, we pretended there was a monster in this box?" The examiner opens the box and 
looks inside first, then encourages the child to look inside. Say, "See? It's empty because we 
were just pretending. Now let's look inside the other box* The examiner and child approach the 
neutral box and both look inside. Say, "See? This box is empty too." 
QIVE CHILD A 8TICKER AND THANK FOR PARTICIPATING! I 
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DATE OF TESTING 
DATE OF BIRTH 
AGE PRETEND BOX L R 
BACKGROUND: 
A. "Have you ever played pretend games? Y N 
B. What Kind of pretend games have you played?" 
GENDER M F 
TEACHER 
STEPS 
A. Child looks in both boxes to see if anything is inside. When child understands both are 
empty, proceed to step B. 
B. "If s okay that the boxes are empty because we're going to play a game of pretend. Ill bet 
you're good at pretending. Do you like bunny rabbits? I want you to pretend there's a bunny 
rabbit in that box 
Now, pretend the rabbit in the box is a nice, white, friendly rabbit. Pretend he's sitting in the box 
and he wants to come out so you can pet him." 
C. MEMORY CHECK (Do not correct wrong answers to these questions) 
1. "Now child's name, tell me what color the rabbit is. white 
other 
2. Is the rabbit friendly or mean? friendly 
mean 
3. Why does the rabbit want to come out of the box? to be petted 
other 
4. Which box is the rabbit in? correct 
incorrect 
5. Now is there really a nice, friendly, white bunny that wants to be petted, or are you just 
pretending?" Pretending 
Real 
D. EXPERIMENTER ABSENCE 
"I have a sticker for you. but I left it in the other 100m. I want you to wait here for me because I 
want to ask you some more questions when I get back. You don't have to stay in that chair while 
I'm gone, but please don't leave this room, okay? Is it okay if I leave for a minute?" 
If YES - leave room for 2 minutes. 
If NO • look inside both boxes with the child to prove they are empty and attempt to leave once 
more. If NO again - reassure child and discontinue interview. 
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E. EXPERIMENTER RETURN 
6. "What did you do while I was gone? Did you stay sitting or did you stand up? 
stayed sitting stood up 
7. Did you look inside one of the boxes?" Y N 
RESPONDERS 
8. "Which box did you look inside? pretend neutral 
9. What did you think when you went to open the box? Did you think there was nothing inside or 
did you think to yourself, 'I wonder if there's a nice, white, bunny rabbit inside1?" 
nothing rabbit 
NON-RESPONDERS 
8NR. "Why didn't you look in the box? 
9NR. Were you sure there was nothing inside the box or did you wonder whether there was a 
rabbit inside?" nothing rabbit 
10NR. Were you thinking anything else?" 
No Response categories: Shy Obedient Scared 
Don't Confused Other 
Care 
POINT TO THE UNUSED BOX AND SAY, 
11. "What about that box there? What if you pretended very, very hard that there was a 
monster inside, what would happen? Would there suddenly be a monster inside the box if you 
pretended very hart? Why or why not?" 
F. DEBRIEFING 
Say. "Okay, let's go together and open up each box. Let's see for sure that both boxes are 
empty." The examiner and child approach the pretend box first Say, "Let's look in this box first. 
Remember, we pretended there was a bunny rabbit in this box?" The examiner opens the box 
and looks inside first, then encourages the child to look inside. Say, "See? It's empty because 
we were just pretending. Now let's look inside the other box." The examiner and child approach 
1he neutral box and both look inside. Say. "See? This box is empty too." 
GIVE CHILD A STICKER AND THANK FOR PARTICIPATING!! 
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CONDITION: MONSTER RABBIT 
PRETEND BOX: L R 




# of seconds before touching 
or opening 
touched - # of times 
opened - # of times 
NEUTRAL 
# of seconds before touching 
or opening 
touched - # of times_ 
opened - # of times_ 
NON-RESPONDER 
120" 

















CONDITION: MONSTER RABBIT 
PRETEND BOX: L R 
ADHERENCE TO 
SCRIPT 
A) Follows script 1 
FACIAL NONVERBALS 
A) Appropriate facial 1 
expressions 
B) Eye contact 
TONE OF VOICE 
1 




Absence of facial 
expressions 
No eye contact 
Monotone voice 
PHYSICAL CONTACT (i.e., pat on back, hand holding, etc.) 
A) Minimal 1 2 3 4 Excessive 
DURATION OF ABSENCE 
A) 120" 1 2 3 4 140" or more 
57 
References 
Estes, D., Wellman H. M., & Woolley, J. D. (1989). Children's 
understanding of mental phenomena. In H. W. Reese (Ed.), Advances in child 
development and behavior. San Diego, CA: Academic Press. 
Fisher, S., & Fisher, R. (1993). Psychology of adaptation to absurdity: 
Tactics of make-believe. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Flavell, J. H. (1986). The development of children's knowledge about the 
appearance-reality distinction. American Psychologist, 41, 418-425. 
Flavell, J. H., Flavell, E. R., & Green, F. L. (1989). A transitional period 
in the development of the appearance-reality distinction. International Journal of 
Behavioral Development, 12, 509-526. 
Harris, P., Brown, E., Marriott, C., Whittall, S., & Harmer, S. (1991). 
Monsters, ghosts and witches: Testing the limits of the fantasy-reality distinction 
in young children. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 9, 105-123. 
Jersild, A. T., & Holmes, F. B. (1935). Methods of overcoming children's 
fears. Journal of Psychology, 1, 75-104. 
Keil, F. C. (1979). Semantic and conceptual development: An 
ontological perspective. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Morris, R., & Kratochwill, T. R. (1983). Treating children's fears and 
phobias. New York: Pergamon. 
Piaget, J. (1929). The child's conception of the world. London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
Schwartz, S., & Johnson, J. H. (1985). Psychopathology of childhood: A 
clinical-experimental approach (2nd ed.). New York: Pergamon Press. 
Schroeder, C.S., Gordon, B.N., & Hawk, B. (1983). Clinical problems of 
the preschool child. In E. Walker & M. Roberts (Eds.), Handbook of clinical child 
psychology. New York: Wiley. 
58 
Subbotskii, E. V. (1985). Preschool children's perception of unusual 
phenomena. Soviet Psychology, 23 (3), 91-114. 
Webster's new world dictionary of the American language (2nd college 
ed.). (1970). New York: Simon & Schuster. 
Wellman, H. M., & Estes, D. (1986). Early understanding of mental 
entities: A reexamination of childhood realism. Child Development, 57, 910-
923. 
